The driving concern of the usus-fruitio distinction for Augustine is how human beings are to relate to themselves, to their neighbours, to earthly goods, and to God. The distinction is subject to the complex demands of accounting for human relations across several planes of lived reality: objects or goods, people, God. At times, Augustine employs the distinction narrowly, in order to contrast earthly goods and God. At other times, he stretches the distinction to accommodate the intricacy of human relationships with each other and with God.
Yet Augustine is not unconcerned with the possibility of instrumentalisation, although this is a modern term foreign to his thought. As his account of the "unnamed friend" reveals, he is familiar with the human tendency to make other people into objects for the satisfaction of one's own desires. The apparently opposite poles of idolatry and instrumentalisation betray a magnetic attraction: the problem with idolatry is precisely that it instrumentalises and objectifies what the self loves for its own pleasure and consumption. Idolatry and instrumentalisation cannot be divorced or simply opposed as concerns; idolatry itself contains an instrumental aspect of which Augustine is not unaware (yet which much contemporary scholarship overlooks). An excessive emphasis on idolatry or instrumentalisation without acknowledgment of their interrelation is likely to create problems in our ordering of loves. Contemporary readers may claim that Augustine is overly concerned with idolatry, opening up the problem of instrumentalisation, but Augustine may turn out to be a greater resource in this problem than the torrent of twentieth century criticism suggests.
1 He may also remind us of the dangers of falling too far on the side of a concern with instrumentalisation without a corresponding concern for idolatry. How are neighbour-love and divine love to be reconciled without falling into either pole of idolatry or instrumentalisation? Tackling Augustine on the usus-fruitio distinction may aid us in envisioning how such a reconciliation might be achieved.
The ongoing scholarly debate over the usus-fruitio distinction has been The book is a broader examination of Augustine on love, therefore in this paper I restrict myself to the focused critique of the usus-fruitio distinction found in the article. 4 These include both direct responses to O'Donovan and responses to the means-ends critique of which he has been the most dominant recent scholarly voice. To name a few: T.J. van is whether his division of the eschatological and ontological frameworks makes sense of Augustine's thought. I will posit that the pilgrimage motif is more complex than O'Donovan has allowed, and that it does not straightforwardly support a purely instrumentalist order of love. My presentation of the pilgrimage motif will reframe the eschatological ordering of love as a necessary complement to the ontological on the terms of O'Donovan's argument, but I further claim that they are not distinct frameworks at all but interwoven threads in a unified Augustinian framework that is fundamentally Christological. Finally, I contend that this integrity of the ontological and eschatological threads of Augustine's thought, united in a Christological dialectic, addresses both the concern for idolatry of earthly goods and earthly friends, as well as the concern for turning those friends into mere instruments. As we shall see, it is precisely by loving the neighbour in God that neighbours are loved not as objects manipulated for satisfying the self's desires but in themselves and as fellow pilgrims. Responding to O'Donovan's critique will allow us to explore the heart of the concern with idolatry and instrumentalisation while addressing the oft-noted but substantivelyneglected pilgrimage motif of the usus-fruitio distinction.
I. O'Donovan's Critique
The pilgrimage motif appears at several points throughout the first book of
De doctrina Christiana. It likens the Christian life on earth to a journey to the homeland, one in which the Christian sojourner must "use" -but not "enjoy" -the road, the vehicles, the pleasures of travelling itself. This imagery typifies the sort of passage that contemporary readers find distasteful and even repugnant about the usus-fruitio distinction and its implications for Augustine's understanding of the Christian's relationship to the world (and especially love relationships between human beings). The concern about the instrumentalisation of creation in the usus-fruitio distinction emerges primarily from the transcendent eschatological 6 nature of Augustine's understanding of love, readily evident in the pilgrimage motif. , Augustine still believes that right uti orders our earthly loves and right frui orders our heavenly ones and that therefore neighbor-love (and I would add, the love of temporal goods insofar as they fall within the providential ordering of the cosmos for harmonious union with God), which belongs to both heavenly and earthly realms, remains subject to both usus and fruitio. Canning, Unity of Love, pp. 114-115. The argument I will make in this paper for the Christological dialectic of the pilgrimage motif supports these readings by proposing that the incarnate mediation establishes the continuity of the heavenly and earthly realms and the integral reciprocity of the ontological and eschatological elements of the distinction. Supposing then that we were exiles in a foreign land, and could only live happily in our own country, and that being unhappy in exile we longed to put an end to our unhappiness and to return to our own country, we would of course need land vehicles or sea-going vessels, which we would have to make use of in order to be able to reach our own country, where we could find true enjoyment. And then suppose we were delighted with the pleasures of the journey, and with the very experience of being conveyed in carriages or ships, and that we were converted to enjoying what we ought to have been using, and were unwilling to finish the journey quickly, and that by being perversely captivated by such agreeable experiences we lost interest in our own country, where alone we could find real happiness in its agreeable familiarity. Well that's how it is in this mortal life in which are exiles away from the Lord; if we wish to return to our home country, where alone we can be truly happy, we have to use this world, not enjoy it, so that we may behold the invisible things of God, brought to our knowledge through the things that have been made; that is, so that we may proceed from temporal and bodily things to grasp those that are eternal and spiritual.
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The first thing to note here is that the image regards the appropriate human relations to earthly goods; the discussion as to appropriate human relationships of love between neighbors has not yet been developed. Augustine's primary concern in this passage is not with how the travellers relate to one another -indeed, that they are travelling together is presupposed (note the plural "we") -but how they experience the journey and relate to its pleasures. Enjoying temporal things mistakenly reflects a failure to grasp the order of temporal and eternal reality. In this sense, the movement is an epistemological one: by gaining knowledge of the invisible things of God in relation to things made, we learn to recognise the order of reality accurately. In this image there is clearly a sense in which certain things (land vehicles and sea-going vessels) are used as instruments -specifically with the epistemological aim of coming to grasp eternal realities. These instruments serve for the voyage but will no longer be needed in the home country, where God will be known and loved fully. To know and to love rightly are interconnected:
the recognition of the ontological status of an object is critical to loving rightly, for ultimately human happiness consists in knowing and enjoying God.
Augustine coordinates grasping and enjoying eternal realities.
If we resist reacting viscerally to this passage, it makes some sense of our relationship to temporal goods. I might delight in a car because it allows me to get from one place to another, and I enjoy the passing scenery, the wind in my hair, the sense of freedom it allows. This delight becomes problematic, however, if I love the car so much that I wish to devote a great deal of my time and energy to the car merely for its own sake to the detriment of my other obligations and relationships. Imagine that I were to love my car so much that I began to sleep in it, for example -not as travellers sometimes do for expediency's sake, or those without homes for necessity's sake, but purely for the sake of sleeping in the car I love so dearly, wishing to extend unto sleep the luxuriating experience of the scent and feel of its leather, the power of its engine cased in steel ready to fire upon ignition, the aesthetic pleasure of its multiple gages and the flowing lines of the dashboard, windshield, wheel. Surely we would think there was something wrong with me. Loving temporal goods this way -excessively, solipsisticallyis unseemly, but worse than that, Augustine says, it is wrong. It will stunt our growth and derail us from our true aim: coming to a full embrace of God, full in knowledge and full in love. This coheres with the notion of ascent present in this passage, of proceeding from temporal bodily things to eternal spiritual things.
These temporal goods are to be used in the more instrumental sense of the term, although even this does not preclude finding pleasure and delight in them. 22 Augustine's concern here is that we might begin to delight excessively in the journey itself and as a result might lose our way or stop altogether, forsaking the ultimate goal in pursuit of the pleasures of travel. the means by which we are being carried along, on account of the goal to which we are being carried.
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Note the dynamism of this image, the sense of movement and of impetus; here Augustine does not hesitate to say that there is a love and a delight in the road and in vehicles, which reflects the development of the usus-fruitio discussion between this appearance and the first. Part of this has to do with the fact that the road has been identified with Christ (a crucial point to which we will return), and that
Augustine has introduced the notion of providence, for God's gifts are to be received with joy.
The ordering of our time on earth and the gifts of divine providence within it elicits love and delight. Loving rightly involves a recognition of the "whole ordering of time" arranged by divine providence. Usus must be read in its connection to the gifts of divine providence, as the relationship appropriate to them. 25 But the road and the vehicles, the temporal realities, are loved and delighted in not as places to rest permanently but along the way to the homeland, just as God's providence sustains creation unto redemption. For Augustine, the problem is not love and delight in these objects per se, but inappropriately 24 Augustine, DDC I.35.39. Only God is to be enjoyed, but here Augustine begins to complicate the distinction between use and enjoyment such that love (in various forms) is involved in both use and enjoyment relationships. Note that Augustine describes this "love" of temporal goods as dilectione and delectatione -not amor, as when he talks about enjoying God -and that we only love (active verb diligamus) temporal goods on account of the goal. This is important because he later says that only human beings and angels are to be loved (diligenda sunt), which distinguishes people from temporal goods. So temporal goods may be used with a certain love (dilectione) and delight (delectatione) and may even be loved (diligamus) on account of the goal, but only people and angels are to be loved (diligenda sunt) full stop, and as we shall see (citation 28) they may be enjoyed (perfruamur) in God. Augustine is not systematic in his use of language and so the way to make sense of these distinctions is to pay attention to the applications of the concepts. The application of the active verb diligere indicates a love that involves companionship (see footnote 27), which is inappropriate to temporal goods. But temporal goods may be loved on account of the goal. The subtlety of this distinction, rather than denigrating human relationships and the particular kind of companionship implied in their love, enhances the status of temporal goods as belonging to our social existence in a way that cannot be easily extricated from the companionship of human love. establishing them as permanent abodes. In this sense, the eschatological framework is crucial to understanding the living dynamism of human love on earth, and indeed it softens what might otherwise be a static ontological divide.
We may delight in the ordering of the world and our loves according to the movement of divine providence. The quality of our attachment in the vital context of our lives, and not just the ontological status of the object in an order of being, matters for the moral quality of our loves. We love "on account of" the goal, and the goal is ordered for our salvation, for our flourishing. A great many aspects of our earthly lives might fall within that providential ordering -including earthly goods -and thus may be loved on account of their role in drawing us along the road to God. The epistemological recognition of the ontological framework clarifies that these objects are not to be loved as if they were the true source of our happiness (mistakenly), but the eschatological framework allows them to be loved as part of the providential ordering of the earthly life for human participation in the divine life. Knowing eternal realities allows one to recognise the ontological ordering of the world and thus to love things rightly within it. But the controversial crux of the usus-fruitio distinction and the pilgrimage imagery concerns not earthly goods so much as human neighbours: to this we now turn.
III. The Collective End: Neighbour-love and Inclusive Eschatology
The interpretation of the pilgrimage motif and its eschatological tones as instrumentalising depends upon the idea that people are signified as vehicles in the same way that temporal goods are. 26 While the instrumentalisation of creation or earthly goods may still be regarded as problematic, the urgent concern of the usus-fruitio debate is the status of human relationships. The question is whether human beings are included in the category of objects that serve merely as "vessels" or "vehicles" carrying us along the way to our ultimate aim. The implication of describing the relationship to both human beings and temporal goods as "use" initially suggests a continuity between them in terms of being vessels. Because if we do that in ourselves, we are standing still on the road, and placing all our hopes of bliss in human beings, or angels. This is a position proud people and proud angels arrogate to themselves, and they are delighted when others place all their hopes in them. But holy people and holy angels, even when we are longing out of weariness to stay still and find our rest in them, prefer rather to provide us simply with refreshment, whether from the fare for the journey they have received for us, or even from what they have received for themselves-but 'received' is the word. And so they urge us, thus refreshed, to continue on the way toward the one by enjoying whom we will share their bliss on equal terms.
29 27 Augustine writes, "only those [things] which can be related to God together with ourselves in a kind of social companionship" (DDC I.23.22, emphasis added) are to be both used and loved (diligenda sunt). He includes in that category human beings, their bodies, and angels. He does blur the distinction between people and temporal goods to some extent, insofar as he speaks of loving the whole ordering of time on account of the goal (footnote 24). The relationship of love and delight is not systematically parsed with regards to people as opposed to temporal goods, for as noted above, he speaks of loving and delighting in things as the gifts of providence, and he claims, "Although, as a matter of fact, there is a closely related sense of 'enjoy,' meaning 'to use with delight.' [cum dilectione uti] When something that is loved, after all, is available to you, delight is also bound to accompany it." Augustine, DDC I.33.37. This parallels the earlier citation and commentary from footnote 24. The distinction between goods and people remains insofar as Augustine speaks of loving temporal goods on account of the goal, whereas Augustine speaks of loving people full stop -and further, only human beings are enjoyed (perfruamur) in God. 28 Augustine, DDC I.32.35, emphasis added. 29 Augustine, DDC I.33.36.
Augustine has well established that we cannot find our permanent rest in human beings qua human beings; this is to "stand still," self-defeatingly, for in so doing we attempt to stand still in what is necessarily moving, shifting and changing around us. But note the relationship he describes between the pilgrims and "holy people and holy angels," who help us along the way to that enjoyment of God and enjoyment of one another in God, providing encouragement and refreshment.
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Not only is there here a picture of hospitality and support among the people of God but most importantly, the final line indicates the anticipation of a communal delight -the bliss that we will share on equal terms. This reflects the communal nature of the beatific aim.
The pilgrimage Augustine describes is not solitary and individual, an obstacle course in which one exploits goods and people to serve one's own eschatological progress. 31 The defining activity of human beings is a movement of love toward a shared enjoyment of God and of one another in God. The end is communal, as is the journey to get there. Love, for Augustine, is fundamentally social in character, and aims not only at individual happiness but at the inclusive end of communal happiness. 32 The continuity of earthly and heavenly love is one of form and content. In form, the very structure of the pilgrimage image is that the way on earth leads to the homeland; the way there is a relational journey modeled on the incarnate Christ, who inhabits the temporal realm in order to form relations of love that bridge earth and heaven. In content, the fulfilment of earthly love (the love practiced on the way) is the collective participation in the divine life; the pilgrim's homeland is that union of love in heaven. Structurally and substantively, therefore, the journey image reflects the continuity of earthly and heavenly love. 30 This image is echoed in De Trinitate: "If however something pleases the will in such a way that it rests in it with a certain delight, and yet is not the thing it is tending toward but is also referred to something else, it should be thought of not as the home country of a citizen but as refreshment, or even a night's lodging for a traveler." Augustine, De Trinitate, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Edmund Hill (New York: New City, 1991), XI.10. 31 As Claussen points out, "peregrinatio is a social, not an individual event." Although "pilgrimage is often taken to be a somewhat solitary exercise, for Augustine, it is not." Rather, it "is something the whole community of saints, whether among the impious or in heaven, does together." Claussen, "'Peregrinatio,'" 43. 32 William O'Connor thus calls this an "intersubjective eudaemonism." O'Connor, "Uti/Frui," 60. Christ moves toward us in the Incarnation, a movement from eternality to temporality, immortality to mortality, incorporeality to embodiment. He then journeys like us and with us, from birth to death, paving a road for us and walking it alongside us: Christ "is the one who wished to offer himself not only to be possessed by those who have arrived, but also to be the way there for those who have come to the beginning of the ways; that is, he wished to take flesh himself." 35 There is a complementary "descent" to the imagery of "ascent" present in the pilgrimage motif, for Christ's descent to us forms our moral life as embodied and relational, in continuity with the heavenly life in which both our bodies and our relationships of love will be perfected.
In Christ's narrative and in our own, there is a succession of descent to ascent: we seek eschatological redemption. Yet it is also the nature of the pilgrimage that even as we move toward the beatific end, we are called to love the neighbour on earth; the continuity of earthly and heavenly love creates an interlocking momentum of ascent and descent in the span of our lives-drawing us upwards by grounding us and grounding us by drawing us upwards. The pilgrimage image clearly involves ascent, but the Christological nature of the pilgrimage motif inherently draws in the importance of earthly-heavenly mediation for our voyage to God, and therefore, of Christ's descent to us in time and flesh. In ascending to God in Christ, we must love as Christ loves, that is to say, incarnationally. Loving the God who becomes human for us means that fruitio Dei does not inhibit human action in the world or extricate it from the world but frees it by ordering it rightly in the world.
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We travel the road in Christ, seeking to know and love God. Yet in knowing God we know ourselves and others more truly, in loving God we must love our neighbours as ourselves, and this is a movement that grounds love in time from eternity. Our journey to God is not therefore simply a vertical movement above and beyond the world, but a movement toward one who took flesh himself in order to walk with us as a human being and show us how to walk in love with our fellow human beings. In the most strikingly tangible articulations of the Christological pilgrimage motif, Augustine asks:
what greater generosity and compassion could [Christ] show, after deliberately making himself the pavement under our feet along which we could return home, than to forgive us all our sins once we had turned back to him, and by being crucified for us to root out the ban blocking our return that had been so firmly fixed in place? 37 Christ is not only the way, the road -he is the very "pavement under our feet." The potency of Christ's mediation is here vividly expressed: for Augustine 36 A point made by Gregory: "Those beloved of God are set free, to a certain extent in this life, to love others." Gregory, POL, p. 362. 37 Augustine, DDC I.17.16.
the image of the paved road is an imperial one, 38 suggesting the power and vast infrastructure of the empire as well as humility and submission to the trampling of many feet. The relationship to Christ is therefore almost all-encompassing: Christ is king and servant, he is the one who walks first, to whom we walk toward, with whom we walk, whom we walk along. He is all things to us: road, way, home, wayfarer. Christ's descent and ascent are narratively distinct, but they are inextricably united in his role as mediator and in the life to which Christ calls us.
We move toward our heavenly ascent but in doing so we must embody the incarnational descent of love. Thus the movements of descent and ascent are not successive, in that we are on a straightforward upward trajectory. Our trajectory, to be sure, is toward heaven, but it is not a simply ascending line. Not only does ascent require descent in the sense of living out the call to love in the world, but as human beings, we are constantly caught between the moral tension of divided wills and the ontological-eschatological tension between time and eternity, this For when you reach him, you also reach the Father, because it is through his equality that the one to whom he is equal can be recognised, with the Holy Spirit binding and so to say gluing us in there, so that we may abide 38 An insight I owe to conversation with Peter Brown.
for ever in that supreme and unchangeable good. From this it can readily be understood how nothing must be allowed to hold us back on the way, when even the Lord himself, insofar as he was prepared to be the way for us, did not wish us to hold onto him, but to pass along him. He did not wish us to cling feebly to any temporal things, even those he took to himself and carried for our salvation, but rather to run eagerly along and through them, and so deserve to be swiftly and finally conveyed to him himself, where he has deposited our nature, freed from all temporal conditions, at the right hand of the Father.
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The aim is eternal life in the bosom of the Trinity, and to this end we cannot become excessively focused even on Jesus. This articulation of the image seems to make the incarnate Jesus a mere conduit for reaching the (immanent) Trinity. better and more worthwhile. That is why, since we are meant to enjoy that truth which is unchangeably alive, and since it is in its light that God the Trinity, author and maker of the universe, provides for all the things he has made, our minds have to be purified, to enable them to perceive that light, and to cling to it once perceived. We should think of this purification process as being a kind of walk, a kind of voyage to our home country. We do not draw near, after all, by movement in place to the one who is present everywhere, but by honest commitment and good behavior. 40 Augustine describes the journey as internal in terms of the purification of the mind (recall the epistemological element of the journey from section II), but he also emphasises the importance of habit and behaviour in drawing near to God, and associates purification with walking as a concrete activity. Clinging to the light requires drawing near through the tangible activities of righting our crooked habits, of walking the paths of moral discipline. If we wish to know and love God, we must take seriously the mundane moral work of the voyage as an embodied undertaking.
For Augustine, the journey moves toward a vision of the Triune God, and it is both an internal ascent 41 as well as an enactment of the earthly moral commitments of honesty and good behaviour. It involves real movement, not only of the mind but of the body. "Of this we would be quite incapable,"
Augustine writes, "unless Wisdom [Christ] herself had seen fit to adapt herself to such infirmity as ours, and had given us an example of how to live, in no other mode than the human one, because we too are human." 42 We would be incapable of making these tangible movements of honest commitment and good behaviour 40 Augustine, DDC I.9.9-10.10. 41 An example from De doctrina Christiana that more closely reflects the notion of a "movement in place": "Furthermore, we are still on the way, a way however not from place to place, but one traveled by the affections. And it was being blocked, as by a barricade of thorn bushes, by the malice of our past sins." Augustine, DDC I.17.16. We see the dialectic at play here; Augustine wants to refute the Neo-Platonic model of an emphasis on the journey of the mind as an extrication from the life of the body, and at the same time to refute the classical emphasis on selfmastery as the management of our actions, neglecting the internal affections, as sufficient for the reorientation of our moral behaviour. 42 Far from compromising the usus-fruitio distinction as a picture of ordered love, the pilgrimage motif is a rich and nuanced image of the complex formation of relationships between human beings and God, on earth and in heaven. Further, this examination of the pilgrimage motif demonstrates that the eschatological framework is not at odds with the ontological; they cannot be separated from each other for they weave together a complementary understanding of the order of love. Alone, each is impoverished. Indeed, they are not, finally, distinct frameworks at all but two integral pieces of a single Augustinian framework for understanding how human beings love rightly as the complex creatures that they are. For Augustine, that understanding of love is fundamentally Christological, which means that it encompasses the earthly and heavenly realities of who we are as selves, neighbours, and believers -that is, as pilgrims.
V. Idolatry and Instrumentalisation: Loving Rightly
The integrity of the eschatological and ontological threads of Augustine's
Christological framework for understanding love of God and of neighbour provides the means for addressing the opening concern of this paper: how are we to avoid the polar pitfalls of idolatry and instrumentalisation in our earthly loving?
The resolution lies in the fact that, like the false dichotomy between the eschatological and ontological frameworks, they are not in fact opposed poles.
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For Augustine, idolatry, the mistaken excessive attribution of value to some person or thing, precisely makes them an instrument of our need in a way that not only fails to satisfy our own needs but disastrously fails to satisfy theirs. In idolising things and people, we risk becoming consumptive and rapacious lovers, for we love in pursuit of something that no earthly object or person can possibly fill. Christ's mediation unites the eschatological and the ontological pieces of human loving in order to hold together our loves in fruitful tension, such that our love may be fecund and nourishing rather than grasping and exploitative.
Loving things wrongly and "using" them unlawfully, which for Augustine means enjoying anything other than God as if it were the source of bliss, is not only idolatrous but constitutes "abuse or misuse."
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Human love therefore must always rightly value the objects of love in relation to the God who creates them, but love also has a referent beyond the human beings themselves that orients them in the context of the journey toward God. The integrity of the ontological and eschatological aspects of usus and fruitio checks our tendency to overrun the 44 Similarly, Eric Gregory notes that usus and fruitio are not opposed, and that if we resist inserting competition into the usus-fruitio discussion, then we have a picture of love that "overcomes any absolute bifurcation of utility and delight," that "attends to the individual as a wonderful creature participating in the luminous beauty of God." Gregory, POL, p. 45. 45 Augustine, DDC I.4.4.
order of loves in search of what Gregory aptly calls a "premature rest." 46 Premature rest is dangerous to ourselves and to others. 47 Take the example of the unnamed friend in Confessiones IV. Here
Augustine recounts how, prior to his own conversion, he had a friend whom he turned "away from the true faith," whose friendship "had been sweet to me beyond all the sweetnesses of life that I had experienced." 48 When this friend falls ill and is baptised, Augustine is surprised to find that when he attempts to joke with him about his emergency baptism, his friend rejects his influence and asks him to stop speaking thus. Augustine decides to wait until his friend has regained health to speak with him again, at which point he anticipates "I would be
able to do what I wished with him." 49 Augustine intends for us to be disturbed by this resolution; unlike the friends he later describes as companions and supports in his own conversion, Augustine here actively plans to turn his friend away from God.
Augustine loves this friend so ardently as the "other self" 50 that he cannot stand to suffer any difference or distinction from him. His friend's change of heart regarding Christianity upon his baptism is unacceptable to Augustine. He cannot bear to have his friend think differently from him for his friend's harmony with him validates and affirms him in his own belief, in his influence, and in his powers of persuasion. Here we catch a glimpse of how the sort of idolatrous love that loves another as the highest sweetness of life may take a rapacious turn. The friend is loved in part for the sweetness of the reflection he provides to Augustine himself; Augustine enjoys the symmetry and identity of their friendship, which bolsters his own sense of self. When that validating symmetry is threatened, he plots to regain it.
God, and thus may we love them for eternity. Here we see the intimate and inextricable relationship in Augustine of the ontological and eschatological aspects of human love:
Rest in [God] and you will be at rest. Where are you going to along rough paths? What is the goal of your journey? The good which you love is from him. But it is only as related to him that it is good and sweet.
Otherwise it will justly become bitter; for all that comes from him is unjustly loved if he has been abandoned. With what end in view do you again and again walk along difficult and laborious paths? There is no rest where you seek for it.
56
Loving something rightly according to its ontological status as a good created thing means loving it not as a thing to rest in, but loving it along the way to the
Creator and the abode of eternal rest. This protects not only the self from wandering away from God, but the neighbour from the impossible demands of a love that seeks in them the source of its joy and meaning. For Augustine, only
God can fill that desire, and therefore no other object or person in the world can rightly "serve" our desires, for they cannot satisfy them. They cannot rightly be instruments of our own satisfaction. But far from undercutting their inherent value, this frees us to offer and receive delight as we truly are.
The concern about instrumentalising people is that they are reduced to objects without value apart from our valuing of them for our own, selfish purposes. But in fact Augustine illustrates in the story of the unnamed friend that it is exactly by loving people apart from God as Creator and Redeemer (that is, outside the ontological and eschatological order of love) that we fall into valuing them for our own purposes rather than for themselves. Instrumentalisation becomes a problem when we have false notions about where we find our happiness. And this is idolatry: locating the source of our happiness in things and people rather than in God. Thus both instrumentalisation and idolatry may involve ontologically or eschatologically disordered love. People become 56 Augustine, Cf IV.xii.18. The centrality of Christ's mediation to the pilgrimage motif reveals the continuity for Augustine of the human, temporal, earthly realm and the divine, eternal heavenly realm. Earthly and heavenly loves are drawn together in Christ, who restores us as creatures both earthly and heavenly by becoming the road for us to travel home together. We love God by loving Christ, and loving Christ means loving as Christ loves -that is, both as embodied, temporal, incarnate creatures and as creatures bound for resurrection in the heavenly afterlife. Far from undermining the neighbour, it assigns to the neighbour a profound value: an eternal value that must be reflected in our love on earth, just as Christ loves us eternally and redemptively by becoming flesh and living amongst us in the world.
The pilgrimage motif draws together the communal journeying of fellow human
